Claud Sykes and British Intelligence in Switzerland
During the First World War, German-occupied Belgium and the neutral Netherlands were the prime territories of interest to the British Secret Service and Military Intelligence. Switzerland, though a secondary ground for intelligence gathering, was important to the British intelligence community. It was a neutral country that bordered two enemy states: Germany and Austria-Hungary. Swiss companies traded with all warring states, Swiss nationals regularly travelled to the belligerent countries, and Switzerland had become an intermediary for postal, telegraphic, and banking transactions between the opposing camps. Switzerland had also become a haven for Russian leftists acting to overthrow the imperial regime (most notably Lenin and his Bolsheviks during 1916) and Indian nationalists. For more on Indian nationalists in wartime Switzerland, click here and a page from the Swiss Broadcasting Corporation's website will open in a new browser window.
The UK, of course, was not the only combatant nation with intelligence operations in Switzerland. All German and Austro-Hungarian embassies and consulates were intelligence stations with officers-in-charge holding diplomatic or consular cover positions. The German consulate in Zurich was also headquarters for sabotage operations in Italy and France. Italian intelligence operations conducted in and through Switzerland were headquartered at the Italian embassy. Italy had three subordinate military intelligence stations in Switzerland: Zurich, Lucerne, and St. Gallen. The French had extensive intelligence and counter-intelligence networks throughout Switzerland. The largest were centered on Zurich, Lausanne, Basel, and Geneva. Headquarters for clandestine Swiss operations was in Belfort, a fortified city near the front.
n/ Keith Jeffery, The Secret History of MI6 (New York: Penguin, 2010); Jim Beach, Haig's Intelligence (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2013); Cosmo Colavito and Filippo Cappelllano, The Secret War on the Italian Front in WWI, 3rd Ed. (Rome: Defense General Staff, 2021); Michael B. Miller, Shanghai on the Metro (Berkeley: Univ. of Calif. Press, 1994).
British Intelligence and Switzerland
During the First World War, the UK had two intelligence organizations that operated in Switzerland: The Special Intelligence Service and the Intelligence Division of General Headquarters, British Expeditionary Force in France. Click here for a schematic which will open from this site in a popup window.
The government had established the SIS in 1909 as the Secret Service Bureau, Foreign Department and never announced publicly its creation. Commander Mansfield Cumming, RN was its first chief and remained as such until his death in 1923. At the outbreak of war, the government gave Cumming's secret organization the cover designation of Section 6 of the General Staff's Operations Division (MO-6). Three months later, the government renamed the Secret Service Bureau the "Special Intelligence Service" but Cumming always referred to it simply as the "Secret Service." SIS in Switzerland sought strategic military, political, and economic intelligence about Germany. There, it also ran counter-intelligence operations but that was not a major part of SIS's work: German operations in Switzerland targeted France, not the UK. The SIS was also the security service's "eyes and ears" in Switzerland and would notify that domestic organization (MO-5) of persons who were threats to the UK and Swiss companies likely involved in illegal British-German trade. Note that the UK, its empire, and its self-governing dominions all prohibited most trade with Germany and its allies. By the end of 1915; however, British exporters lost enthusiasm for the blockade and began to circumvent trade restrictions.
The BEF's intelligence organization was Section I of GHQ Staff and was at first commanded by Colonel George Macdonogh, RE. Its clandestine operations were run by Sub-Section I(b) under Lieutenant-Colonel Walter Kirke. GHQ France gathered operational intelligence on the German army. It was particularly interested in the German Army's order-of-battle on the Western Front.
The principal GHQ France intelligence operation was in Belgium and the Netherlands where Kirke had two networks. Major Ernest Wallinger ran one from London and Major Cecil Cameron, RA the other from Folkestone. In early-1915, Macdonogh authorized intelligence operations in Switzerland. Kirke established two Swiss networks, one under John Wallinger of the Indian Political Intelligence Office, the other under Lieutenant George W. Pollitt. John Wallinger, brother of Major Ernest Wallinger, since before the war lived in Paris from where he spied on Indian nationalists operating in Europe. Over several years he had developed a large network of agents to which in 1915, he assigned the extra task of military intelligence. He also recruited additional agents to gather intelligence on the Central Powers. Wallinger's head agent for Swiss military intelligence operations was the Frenchman Baron Berault. Kirke stationed Berault at Evian on the French shore of Lake Geneva. Pollitt was a senior scientist at the large, English chemical firm of Brunner, Mund & Co. He had enlisted in August 1914 and was commissioned into the Intelligence Corps in October. The army assigned him to intelligence because he received his PhD from the University of Basel and was fluent in French and German. Kirke stationed Pollitt in Zurich.
At the commencement of hostilities, SIS had one agent in Switzerland, "S1" who was based in Zurich. S1 was an Englishman employed by a Swiss shipping firm and paid his co-workers to provide him with information obtained through their business trips in Germany. In April 1915, Cumming ordered two of his officers to establish additional spy networks in Switzerland. One network was headed by Lewis Gordon Campbell, a mining engineer who in 1914 was working in Portuguese East Africa. Cumming placed Campbell in Annemasse, France just across the border from Geneva, Switzerland. The other network was run out of Berne, Switzerland by Hanns Vischer. Vischer was a Swiss-born, naturalized British subject, educated at Cambridge, and for eleven years a Colonial Service officer in Africa.
The UK's intelligence foray into Switzerland was a failure. Nearly all of John Wallinger's new agents, including Berault, were uncovered by the Swiss police. The Swiss arrested most of Campbell's agents and Campbell himself escaped arrest by a timely return to Annemasse from one of his many trips to Switzerland. Nearly all Vischer's agents, like Campbell's, were arrested, including some in Germany. Cumming recalled Vischer to London and disbanded his agent network. The only British network in Switzerland that survived 1915 intact was Pollitt's. In 1916, Pollitt resigned his intelligence position to serve with the Royal Engineers. Before leaving, he recruited his replacement, Edward Bela Harran, a scientist colleague at Brunner, Mund. Harran was born in England to Hungarian immigrants.
In June 1916, Cumming placed all his Swiss counter-espionage operations under the British industrialist Redmond Barton Cafferata. Cafferata was based in Pontarlier, France on the Swiss border near Lausanne. Campbell's agents now concentrated on intelligence gathering, while Cafferata's tried to thwart German intelligence operations in Switzerland. Subsequently, GHQ France terminated its Swiss intelligence operation. Kirke handed his intelligence assets there to SIS. Cumming replaced Campbell with Harran who became the chief Swiss station officer for intelligence; Cafferata remained in charge of counter-intelligence. John Wallinger retained control of his pre-War, India Office agents but now passed their military intelligence to Cumming, not the BEF's Colonel Kirke. John Wallinger never re-established a separate organization to concentrate exclusively on gathering intelligence on Germany and its allies.
In September 1916, the Foreign Office appointed Horace George Montagu Rumbold British ambassador to Switzerland. Rumbold ignored Foreign Office rules that greatly restricted diplomatic and consular staff involvement with SIS. At Cumming's request, Rumbold appointed Harran, who held a wartime army commission, Assistant Military Attache. At the British embassy in Berne, Harran had three subordinate officers, two of whom had diplomatic status. Rumbold further assisted SIS by appointing its officers as vice-consuls in Zurich and Geneva. The officers in Zurich and Geneva reported to Harran as would the SIS vice-consuls in Basel and Lausanne appointed the following year.
At the beginning of 1917, the SIS organization in Switzerland consisted of two officers-in-charge (Harran and Caffereta), their assistants (one each), and four field officers who controlled seven agents (one of whom was Claud Sykes). During the year, the SIS Swiss presence grew and by July consisted of ten officers in France and Switzerland directing well over twenty-five agents who in turn had numerous sub-agents. (Click here for an organization chart which will open from this site in a popup window.) In January 1918, Cumming replaced Harran with Vischer as head of Swiss intelligence operations. In April, he sent Cafferata to Athens and replaced him with an officer named Crowley. Seven months later the war was over.
British intelligence in Switzerland, unlike in the Netherlands, was not very productive. By the middle of 1917, SIS agents there, at best, could get one sub-agent to visit Germany about every three months. Of those that entered enemy territory, only one in five came back with even marginally useful information. Zurich, formerly the SIS station for military intelligence from Germany, came to specialize in commercial intelligence, primarily to support the UK's trade blockade of the Central Powers. From Switzerland, Cumming received mostly open-source intelligence plus military and diplomatic gossip. Secret intelligence reports, often unreliable, were thoroughly reviewed by SIS in London before passing to the War Office, Foreign Office, or Admiralty. At times, SIS provided Swiss intelligence to its customers with a reliability caveat. Swiss intelligence operations; however, did provide useful information in support of the UK's trade blockade.
n/ Jeffrey, Secret History of MI6; Christopher Andrew, Secret Service (London: Heinemann, 1985); Nigel West, At Her Majesty's Secret Service (Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword, 2016); Michael Smith, Six, The Real James Bonds (London: Biteback, 2011), 96-112; Beach, Haig's Intelligence; London Gazette, March 2, 1915; John McDermott, "Trading with the Enemy," Canadian Journal of History 32 (August 1997): 201-19; Register of the Associates and Old Students of the Royal School of Mines, 1920, s.v. "Campbell, Lewis Gordon;" Richard J. Popplewell, Intelligence and Imperial Defence (London: Cass, 1995), 216-35; Richard Cafferata, "Redmond Barton Cafferata,"Cafferata Family History, www.cafferata.synthasite.com (Click on the link and the cited page will open in a new browser window.); Richard Cafferata's Redmond Cafferata Papers on Microsoft One Drive, accessed through The Great War Forum, www.greatwarforum.org/topic/190220-redmond-barton-cafferata-military-intelligence.
Sykes' Suitability for Intelligence Work in Zurich
Claud Sykes was a very attractive candidate for intelligence work; especially for a posting in German-speaking Zurich. He was of a British establishment family, spoke German like a native, and had lived in Germany. Note that early in the war, the British Army would assign a serviceman to the intelligence corps simply for his knowledge of a foreign language. According to the British Consul-Gerneral in Zurich, in 1915 the local population was not only pro-German but Anglophobic. (For his report of May 12, 19015, click here and it will open in a popup window.)
Furthermore, Sykes was the sort that senior intelligence officers trusted: a public school graduate with family members in the armed forces and sensitive state positions. "Being from the right sort of family was often a determining factor in hiring British men for intelligence work ..."
n/ Report to Foreign Office, H. Angst, UK National Archives FO 371/2474; Tammy M. Proctor, "Family Ties in the Making of Modern Intelligence," Journal of Social History 39, No. 2 (Winter 2005): 451-66.
Another factor that made Sykes a good fit for intelligence work was that he had acting skills. Note that one of the first four civilian officers of SIS was the actor Guy Standing who had appeared frequently on West End and Broadway stages. In August 1914, 41-year-old Standing was in Los Angeles to act in a Lasky Feature Play Company film, The Silver King, but hurried back to the UK before filming commenced. Cumming recruited Standing in 1915 and placed him in charge of all operations in the Americas.
n/ From 1892 to 1909 Standing lived and acted in the US. He returned to England in 1909 and for four years acted there before going back to the US. Standing would be knighted in 1919 and make his film debut in 1933 (The Story of Temple Drake). Allan R. Ellenberger, "Sir Guy Standing's Mythical Death" on his website Holywoodland, www.allanellenberger.com.
British nationals who served as intelligence officers or agents operating abroad were recruited informally. A few members of the armed forces; however, were simply assigned to SIS by the War Office or Admiralty. Members of the British establishment, on their own initiative, often referred candidates to the secret services through third-parties in state offices (Foreign Office, Home Office, War Office, the Admiralty). If the SIS or Military Intelligence found the candidate attractive, an interview would be arranged which would take place in a government office or rented commercial establishment. Most British nationals brought into SIS were recruited through internal referrals. For example, an officer who ran SIS operations in the Netherlands and Belgium had been referred to Cumming by his secretary. She had dated him and realized that a young army officer who had lived on the Continent and was fluent in Dutch, German, and French, would be of great use to her boss.
An example of an English civilian who became a GHQ France operative abroad is the author W. Somerset Maugham. In September 1915, he was recruited by a friend, Ernest Wallinger of GHQ France. Wallinger handed Maugham over to his brother, John Wallinger. In early October, John Wallinger sent Maugham first to Lucerne and shortly thereafter to Geneva. Maugham spent only four months as an intelligence agent in Switzerland, having resigned from GHQ France in January 1916. In 1918, he was recruited into SIS by Cumming and sent to Russia. Other authors who did secret, wartime work were John Buchan, Director of Intelligence for the Ministry of Information and Compton Mackenzie, head of the joint SIS and military Eastern Mediterranean Special Intelligence Bureau.
n/ Henry Landau, All's Fair (New York: Putnam, 1934); W. Somerset Maugham, Ashenden (New York: Doubleday, Doran, 1928); Andrew, Secret Service; Nigel West, MI5, (Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword, 2019); Ted Morgan, Maugham (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1980).
Redmond Cafferata, chief of British counter-intelligence in Switzerland, found British nationals superior to foreigners as secret agents. In his personal papers, he wrote as follows of such agents in Switzerland: "If a man has even a slight excuse of health, business or other reason for being in Switzerland, it would be many months before the Swiss begin to ask awkward questions." Note that in 1954, Sykes, when interviewed by the author Patricia Hutchins, told her that for "... health reasons [he] was obliged to go to Switzerland in 1915, choosing Zurich as likely to be a lively place."
n/ Andrew, Secret Service; Richard Cafferata, "Redmond Barton Cafferata;" Patricia Hutchins, James Joyce's World (London: Methuen, 1957), 98.
Sykes as an Intelligence Agent
Percy Molesworth Sykes, son of Claud's uncle the Rev. William Sykes, likely brought Claud to the attention of Army Intelligence. He was a career army officer who for twenty years did intelligence and diplomatic work for the Indian Political Department. At the outbreak of the First World War, Lt.-Col. Sykes was in England on leave. The War Office recalled the colonel into the British Army and posted him to Southampton were he was "Commandant of the Port." In October 1914, the army attached Sykes to the Indian Corps, newly arrived in France, as an interpreter. In early 1915, he was in England on leave when the War Office returned him to the Indian Government.Percy Sykes likely knew Supt. John Wallinger of the Indian Police who since 1909, was in Paris as head of Indian Political Intelligence's European operation. John Wallinger probably brought Sykes to the attention of his London-based brother, Ernest, who interviewed Sykes as he did Somerset Maugham.
In the Spring of 1915, Sykes was evidently on the Military Intelligence roster of secret agents as in July his name was submitted to Kirke, chief of the Secret Intelligence section of GHQ France, for service in Switzerland.
n/ In February 1915, Percy Sykes was appointed acting consul-general in Kashgar, China and the following month, left England for his new post. In March 1916, the War Office assigned Col. Sykes to the army's intelligence corps and placed him in command of the newly formed British Military Mission to South Persia with temporary rank of Brigadier-General. There, he commanded a primarily native, Persian force that the War Office formed to reign-in pro-German, Persian rebels. Antony Wynn, Persia in the Great Game (London: Murray, 2003); F. V. Moberly, Official History of the War, Operations in Persia (London: HMSO, 1929); Kirke War Diary.
By October 1915, Sykes was in Zurich as one of Lt. Pollitt’s agents. His first intelligence report arrived on Kirke’s desk in November and Kirke found it useless as it had no operational, military intelligence.
n/ War Diary of Sir Walter Mervyn St. George Kirke, Book 1, Imperial War Museum Documents.20171, I(b).
This was the case for nearly all reports by Kirke’s agents in Switzerland and was due to the military situation. The mission of the BEF's spies in Switzerland was to obtain intelligence on German forces deployed on the Upper-Rhine sector of the Western Front. In that area, there was little German military activity and it was also extremely difficult for British agents to monitor such activity. Unlike the Northern and Central Sectors of the Western Front, the Southern Sector’s lines-of-communication ran through Germany, not occupied territory. In Belgium and France, there were many civilians willing to help the Entente Powers; there were hardly any such persons in Germany. (For more on the military situation on the Western Front near Switzerland, click here and a pdf from this website will open in a popup window.) To obtain information on the movements of troops and munitions along the Rhine, GHQ France would have to depend on Swiss nationals temporarily in Germany. Of course, such persons would be watched closely by German counter-intelligence and the police. (See, BERNARD in Secrets of Modern Spying below.)
While Sykes was unable to supply GHQ France with the information it wanted, he, unlike most British agents in 1915 Switzerland, was not arrested, or uncovered, by the Swiss police. While the Swiss authorities were undoubtedly interested in Sykes, they apparently concluded he was not a British agent.
As GHQ France’s Switzerland operation was not productive, McDonogh, head of BEF intelligence, terminated it in mid-1916. The War Office then transferred the BEF’s remaining intelligence assets in Switzerland to Cumming’s civilian Secret Intelligence Service. What Sykes did while employed by SIS is not of public record. SIS, commonly known as "MI-6," does not transfer its old records to the UK’s National Archives as does the War Office and the Secret Security Service, "MI-5."
Vigilant [Claud W. Sykes], Secrets of Modern Spying (London: John Hamilton, 1930)
This book was Sykes' first published non-fiction work and shares characteristics with W. Somerset Maugham's Ashenden which came out two years earlier. In that book's preface, Maugham states emphatically that the only part of the work that is non-fiction is the recurring theme of the boring, routine nature of intelligence work. He declaims that all covert operations portrayed are inventions of his literary imagination. Sykes probably read Ashenden as Secrets of Modern Spying contains several episodes that appear in Maugham's book.
Maugham's preface shouldn't be taken at face value. For example, the character Ashenden (whom the author never gave a forename) kept in touch with army intelligence from a French town on Lake Geneva. As stated previously, GHQ France did have an intelligence station on the south shore of Lake Geneva at Evian. Furthermore, Ashenden dealt with several persons with real-life counterparts, such as the French dairy woman who regularly brought secret messages to and from Switzerland, the British sub-agent codenamed "BERNARD," a Swiss national who worked in Germany as a waiter, and an English traitor living in Lucerne with his German wife. Three of the Ashenden stories came from Gerald Kelly, a friend of Maugham's who had worked for SIS in Spain. Maugham told his biographer that Ashenden was overall, a truthful account of his First World War spying. He also stated there were several stories in manuscript form which on the advice of his friend Winston Churchill, he did not submit to the publisher.
Brinson and Dove said of Sykes' book that "Many of the episodes described were already in the public domain, others seem to be written with inside knowledge, but whether the book is the work of a professional spy or a well-connected journalist is difficult to say." Note that none of Sykes' associates in Zurich, including Joyce, ever stated he worked in Switzerland as a journalist. They always describe Sykes as an English teacher.
The book has five pages on what Sykes terms the "commercial spy." There, he states the importance of such intelligence agents to the UK's wartime blockade and enforcement of its Trading with the Enemy Act. Sykes notes that the secret service "furnished all the evidence which enabled the prize courts to condemn the captured ships that carried contraband." As noted above, the SIS Zurich station was involved primarily in commercial intelligence.
In Zurich, Sykes was an avid hiker, which prompted Joyce to write the following limerick:
There is a clean climber called SykesWho goes scrambling through ditches and dykesTo skate on his scalpDown the side of an alpIs the kind of diversion he likes.
In his book, Sykes explains that from the Swiss town of Romanshorn on Lake Constance, one can view through good binoculars the German zeppelin base at Friedrichshafen, Germany on the opposite shore. Zurich is connected to Romanshorn by rail and it's likely Sykes made that journey there several times, seemingly to hike along the picturesque shore of Lake Constance.
In the book's chapter "A Nation of Amateur Spies," Sykes is emphatic that a great spy is born as such and not made through training and experience. Near the book's beginning, he seems to describe himself and why he would have been useful as a British spy in Switzerland:
"During the war enemy subjects visiting neutral countries were naturally potential sources of information for an alert agent. In such cases the spy often posed as a pacifist who had taken refuge in a neutral land to avoid conscription; if he found his subject was not too ardent a patriot he could win his heart and set his tongue flowing by preaching internationalism and universal brotherhood. If, however, the subject was convinced of his own country's good cause, the agent often found it good policy to let himself be converted, whereupon the subject, pleased to have won over a member of an enemy race, began to boast of his country's prowess and resources, and thus let fall much interesting information."
Secrets of Modern Spying, pp. 19-20.
In the late-1930s, when Sykes worked for MI-5, had German intelligence known he was the Vigilant who authored The Secrets of Spying, Ortsgruppenleiter Roesel and Nazi sympathizers would not have been so open with him. (See Claud Sykes, Part 2, this website.)
n/ Andrew, Secret Service; Ted Morgan, Maugham (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1980); Postcard, Joyce to Sykes, September 5, 1917, Letters of James Joyce, Vol. 2, Richard Ellman, ed. (New York: Viking, 1966; [Sykes], Secrets of Modern Spying, 57; Charmian Brinson and Richard Dove, A Matter of Intelligence (Manchester: Manchester Univ. Press, 2014).
Sykes Family Knowledge of Claud's Spying
A few persons outside of the intelligence community knew of Sykes' intelligence activity in Switzerland. Certainly, Claud Sykes told his wife Daisy about why they were going to Switzerland. He likely also told his father, a retired army officer, that he was going to Switzerland on some sort of official, state business. Col. Sykes would have deduced the real reason. As stated on the Sykes biography website page, after the British government introduced compulsory military service in 1915, Col. Sykes served on the local "draft board." He would not have taken that position if he had suspected his son was a draft-dodger.
There is evidence that other family members, or at least one of his nieces, believed Sykes spied in Switzerland. The following post concerning Sykes/Vigilant by "Avril" appears on The Aerodrome, a First World War aviation web forum:
"My grandmother is also fairly certain that he worked as a spy during the war, and says that he was NOT in the airforce." Posted December 11, 2011.
n/ Avril, "Claude W. Sykes," The Aerodrom Forum, WWI Aviation>People>Claud W. Sykes. "Avril" would be a descendant of Claud's sister, Esme Cecilia, who in 1915 married Francis Sneade Pardoe. They had four grandchildren; two boys and two girls. Claud's brother, Edmund Arthur, had two children but no grandchildren.
Sykes' Zurich Targets
Among Sykes' friends and acquaintances in Zurich were likely and actual subject's of interest to British intelligence. Of course, Sykes was not unique in that respect as nearly all middle-class, foreign residents of wartime Zurich mingled with persons the British would have considered suspicious.
A known target of British intelligence was Sykes' author friend, Karl Bleibtreu. Bleibtreu, a founder of the Zurich-based International Pro-India Committee, was under surveillance by John Wallinger's agent, Erwin Eduard Briess. Briess was a Moravian-born, naturalized Swiss citizen who was a recognized expert on Indian culture and languages and vice-president of the Pro-India Committee. In 1918, Swiss police uncovered a German covert operation that through the German consulate, supplied bombs and firearms to Indian nationalists and Italian anarchists. Briess was a witness for the prosecution in the "Zurich Bomb Plot" trial the following year.
Another of Sykes' friends of likely interest to the SIS was Frank Budgen, whom he met through Joyce. Though Budgen was employed as a British propagandist by the Ministry of Information, that organization might not have known, or was indifferent to, Budgen's past left-wing activities. Before moving to Paris in 1910, Budgen, while employed by the Post Office in London, was active in the Socialist Labour Party and at one time was its general secretary. The party, founded in 1903, had about 1,000 members, mostly in Scotland. It faded in 1920 when most members left to join the newly formed Communist Party of Great Britain.
British embassy staff in Berne knew of Budgen's ideological background, information likely received from SIS. Budgen, like Sykes, became a close friend of the Joyces. In Zurich, Budgen's cover employment was with the British consulate which paid him £2 10s. weekly.
The shady character Jules De Vries, a small-time crook with big ideas, probably sought employment as a secret agent. As a citizen of a neutral nation, he would have accepted payment for such service from all comers. De Vries wouldn't have had any qualms about working for both sides concurrently and providing each with fabricated information or specious gossip. Sykes had good reason to have kept tabs on the Dutchman, De Vries.
James Joyce would have been of interest to British intelligence, first as a possible agent of Austria-Hungary, then after the Easter Rising of April 1916, as possible agent of the underground Provisional Government of the Irish Republic or the Irish Volunteers (subsequently renamed the Irish Republican Army). As Sykes was a spy, his statement to Richard Ellmann that he "had seen Joyce" at the Museum Society library and knew of his reputation, raises the question of whether Sykes was watching the expatriate author.
Though all the above would have been of interest to the British secret services, none appear on MI-5's "Black List" of likely enemy agents.
n/ Raymond Challinor, The Origins of British Bolshevism (London: Croom, Helm, 1977), 107-22; Frank Budgen, Myselves When Young (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1970); Ole Birk Laursen, “The bomb plot in Zurich” in Anarchism, 1914-18, M.S. Adams and R. Kinna, eds. (Manchester: Manchester Univ. Press, 2017), 135-154; Marsha L. Rozenblit "Jews, German Culture, and the Dilemma of National Identity: The Case of Moravia, 1848-1938", Jewish Social Studies 20, no. 1 (Fall 2013):77-120; Ellmann, James Joyce, 411; MI-5, D Branch Report, 1921, UK National Archives KV 1/19; MI-5 Black List, First World War, UK National Archives TNA KV 61/1.
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